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Whether a human fetus experiences pain during an abortion has been the
subject of heated debate within medical, legal, and political circles for over
two decades. In the 1980's President Reagan's'statement that "when the
lives of the unborn are snuffed out [by abortion], they often feel pain, pain
that is long and agonizing,"' and the release of a controversial film entitled
"The Silent Scream" 2 were merely two of the events that kept this issue in
public view. Federal and state legislative efforts to enact "partial birth
" Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas. I am grateful for the thoughtful
critiques of this article by Dr. Watson A. Bowes, Jr., Dr. Byron Calhoun, Jan Mort, and Elisa Ugarte,
Esq.
1. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at The National Religious Broadcasters Convention (Jan.
30, 1984) (transcript available at http://wwwreagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1984/
13084b.htm).
2. THE SILENT SCREAM (American Portrait Films 1984) (script and visual images available at
http://www.silentscream.org).
abortion bans" during the last half of the 1990's reignited public debate over
fetal pain.3 Two and a half years ago, the argument intensified when the
world caught a glimpse of life within the womb through the picture of
Samuel Armas' tiny hand apparently grasping the finger of the perinatal
surgeon who was repairing the spine of the twenty-one week old fetus. 4 As
the twenty-first century begins, there are some indications that advances in
medical knowledge are resolving the debate in medical circles surrounding
fetal pain, and the resolution favors its acknowledgment at some point prior
to birth.5
The purpose of this article is to explore the nature and extent of the
medical community's emerging consensus on the issue of fetal pain, and
consider whether this consensus should be reflected in American law. Part I
discusses the current state of medical knowledge regarding fetal experiences
of pain. Part II describes recent changes in medical standards to
acknowledge the possibility of fetal pain. The federal constitutionality of
laws directed at minimizing or protecting the human fetus from pain is
discussed in Part III. Common objections to fetal pain legislation are
identified and answered in Part IV. This article concludes with a call for
legal requirements that women seeking abortions be informed of the
possibility that the fetus may experience pain after twelve weeks gestation,
and offered fetal anesthetic or modified abortion procedures to minimize any
possibility of fetal pain.
3. James Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, Partial Birth Abortion: The Final Frontier of Abortion
Jurisprudence, 14 ISSUES L & MED. 3 (1998).
4. Samuel Armas photo (2002), available at http://www.fetal-surgery.com/fs-pics.htm. In utero
fetal surgery made the news recently with reports of successful heart surgery on a 23-week-old fetus.
Denise Grady, Operation on Fetus's Heart Valve Called a "Science Fiction " Success, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2002, at A 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/25/health/25FETA.html.
5. See Fran Lang Porter, et al., Pain and Pain Management in Newborn Infants: A Survey of
Physicians and Nurses, 100 PEDIATRICS 626 (1997) (stating that "ample data now indicate that the
neurophysiologic basis for pain is established by the end of the second trimester of pregnancy");
ROYAL COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, FETAL AWARENESS: REPORT OF A
WORKING PARTY (1997) (providing that practitioners who undertake termination of pregnancy at 24
weeks or later should consider the requirements for fetal analgesia or sedation prior to fetocide);
American Academy of Pediatrics & Canadian Paediatric Society, Committee on Fetus and Newborn,
Prevention and Management of Pain and Stress in the Neonate, 105 PEDIATRICS 454 (2000) (stating
that "[b]y late gestation, the fetus has developed the anatomic, neurophysiological, and hormonal
components necessary to perceive pain."); COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO FETAL SENTIENCE, THE
RAWLINSON REPORT (1996) ("the fetus may be able to experience suffering from around 11 weeks
of development"), available at www.care.org.uk; ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
OF ALBERTA, POLICY ON TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY (2000) (stating that "[in some
circumstances, in order to reduce suffering where intervention is necessary to terminate pregnancy
after 20 weeks/0 days, patient and physician may consider feticide prior to initiating the termination
procedure"). See also B.A. Robinson, Can a Fetus Feel Pain?, (2001), available at http://www.
religioustolerance.org/abo_pain.htm.
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I. THE SCIENCE OF FETAL PAIN
Physicians, like lawyers, must carefully define their terms prior to
seeking an answer to any particular question. Before attempting to answer
the question of whether a human fetus "feels pain," it is necessary to
establish what the words "feels" and "pain" mean in this context.6 Much of
the divergence in medical opinion on the existence of fetal pain can be
explained by noting the absence of a common definition of these key terms.
The three competing definitions revolve around whether "feels" means to
have a "conscious appreciation of' or merely "experience," and how such
appreciation or experience can be ascertained.
A. Conscious Appreciation
Some physicians restrictively define "feels" to mean only those
responses that reflect some self-awareness or "conscious appreciation of
pain."7 In the absence of consciousness, they argue that the most researchers
can conclude is that the human fetus "reacts to physical stimulation."8
"Whether the fetus feels pain, however, hinges not on its biological
development but on its conscious development. Unless it can be shown that
the fetus has a conscious appreciation of pain after 26 weeks, then the
response to noxious stimulation must still essentially be reflex, exactly as
before 26 weeks." 9
While representing a minority view among physicians, as evidenced by
the use of pain medication for certain in utero procedures performed on the
6. Adrian R. Lloyd-Thomas & Maria Fitzgerald, Reflex Responses Do Not Necessarily Signify
Pain, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 797 (1996), available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/313/
7060/797.
7. Testimony of Dr. Stuart Derbyshire, Commission of Inquiry into Fetal Sentience (Mar. 6,
1996), available at http://www.care.org.uk/issues/fs/derbyshr.htm. See also Zbigniew Szawarski,
Commentary: Probably No Pain in the Absence of "Self," 313 BRIT. MED. J. 796 (1996), available at
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/313/7060/796.
8. Hugh Muir, When does pain begin?, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 28, 1996, at 8.
Groups such as the Birth Control Trust, whose director Ann Furedi co-wrote one of the
papers, admit that the foetus reacts to physical stimulation, such as procedures involving
needles, from around 12 to 14 weeks. They agree that stress levels can rise in these
circumstances. But they argue that the mere reaction to physical stimuli does not
automatically indicate the feeling of pain.
Id.
9. Stuart Derbyshire & Ann Furedi, "Fetal Pain " is a Misnomer, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 795 (1996),
available at http:wwwbmj.com/cgi/content/full313/7060/795/a. See also Stuart Derbyshire, There
Is No Such Thing as 'Fetal Pain,' LIVING MARXISM, Sept. 1996, at 8; Lloyd-Thomas & Fitzgerald,
supra note 7, at 797.
fetus,' ° this reasoning was embraced by the federal district court in Women's
Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich. I1 In the absence of medical
testimony that the fetus "experiences a conscious awareness of pain," the
court concluded that the state could not justify a ban on D&X, or "partial
birth" abortion, as preventing unnecessary cruelty to the fetus. 12 In essence,
the court reasoned that absent "mindful awareness" of noxious stimuli by the
fetus, 13 there can be no pain, and in the absence of pain, there can be no
cruelty. 4
B. Behavioral and Physiological Responses
This requirement of consciousness, as a predicate to the experience of
pain, has been rejected by other physicians. These doctors argue that
observed physiological 5 and behavioral responses 16 to stimuli are reliable
10. See generally Charles B. Caldwell et al., Anesthesia and Monitoring for Fetal Intervention,
in THE UNBORN PATIENT 149 (Michael R. Harrison et al., 3d ed. 2001); Alan C. Santos &
Mieczyslaw Finster, Perinatal Pharmacology, in SHNIDER AND LEVINSON'S ANESTHESIA FOR
OBSTETRICS 61 (Samuel C. Hughes et al. eds., 2002); Mark A. Rosen, Anesthesia for Fetal
Procedures and Surgery, in ANESTHESIA FOR OBSTETRICS 285 (Sol M. Shooder et al. 3d ed. 1993).
11. 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
12. Id. at 1074. In Stenberg v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy provided a layperson's description of
the D&X procedure:
In the D&X, the abortionist initiates the woman's natural delivery process by causing the
cervix of the woman to be dilated, sometimes over a sequence of days. The fetus' arms
and legs are delivered outside the uterus while the fetus is alive; witnesses to the
procedure report seeing the body of the fetus moving outside the woman's body. At this
point, the abortion procedure has the appearance of a live birth.... With only the head of
the fetus remaining in utero, the abortionist tears open the skull. According to Dr. Martin
Haskell, a leading proponent of the procedure, the appropriate instrument to be used at
this stage of the abortion is a pair of scissors. Witnesses report observing the portion of
the fetus outside the woman react to the skull penetration. The abortionist then inserts a
suction tube and vacuums out the developing brain and other matter found within the
skull. The process of making the size of the fetus' head smaller is given the clinically
neutral term "reduction procedure." Brain death does not occur until after the skull
invasion, and, according to Dr. Carhart, the heart of the fetus may continue to beat for
minutes after the contents of the skull are vacuumed out. The abortionist next completes
the delivery of a dead fetus, intact except for the damage to the head and the missing
contents of the skull.
530 U.S. 914, 958-59 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
13. 911 F. Supp. at 1073.
14. Id. at 1074. See also Interview by Bob Abemethy with Peter Singer, Professor, Princeton
University, in PBA RELIGION & ETHICS NEWSWEEKLY (1999), (stating that "[k]illing a newborn
baby-whether able-bodied or not-I think, is never equivalent to killing a being who wants to go
on living. It's different. It's still-almost always wrong, but it's different"), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/transcripts/singer.html.
15. Physiological changes include changes in heart rate or the increased production of stress
hormones. Parliamentary Office of Science & Tech., Advice to the Department of Health, in FETAL
AWARENESS 3, (Feb. 199.7), available at http://www.parliament.uk/post/pn094.pdf.
16. Id. Behavioral changes include withdrawal of affected body parts, crying, and facial
expressions. Id.
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indicators of pain, particularly for those individuals who are incapable of the
self-reporting that is seemingly required for identification of self-awareness
or consciousness. 17  While conceding the lack of perfect correspondence
between behavioral and physiological indicia and the actual experience of
pain, these physicians note that self-reports of pain and the actual experience
of pain also lack a perfect correspondence.18 In the absence of the ability to
self-report, physical evidence of pain-like responses should be viewed as
"infantile forms of self-report and should not be discounted as 'surrogate
measures' of pain."' 9 In the face of physiological and behavioral responses
to noxious stimuli, these physicians assert that the burden of proof shifts to
those who challenge the existence of fetal pain rather than having to be
borne by those who seek to alleviate it.
20
C. Neurological Development
Physicians subscribing to the view that fetal pain should be presumed in
cases involving physiological and behavioral responses often reinforce their
17. See K.J.S. Anand & Kenneth D. Craig, Editorial: New Perspectives on the Definition of
Pain, 67 PAIN 3 (1996) (stating that "because self-report may be absent or a faulty source of
inference, nonverbal behavioral information is often needed and used for pain assessment."). See
also American Academy of Pediatrics & Canadian Paediatric Society, Prevention and Management
of Pain and Stress in the Neonate, 105 PEDIATRICS 454 (2000), available at
http://www.aap.orgpolicy/re9945.html.
18. Anand & Craig, supra note 17, at 3.
19. Id. at 5. See also Vivette Glover & Nicholas Fisk, Do Fetuses Feel Pain?, 313 BRIT. MED. J.
796 (1996) (arguing that fetal stress responses may be the best indices of pain currently available).
20. John Wyatt, When Do We Begin to Feel the Pain?, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 1996, at 2.
While responsible scientists have a duty to emphasise what they don't know, doctors
have a duty of care that should lead them to err on the side of caution. If there is a
possibility of lasting harm, we must act in the best interests of our patients even when the
evidence is ambiguous. We should, in the words of Glover [a clinical scientist in the
psychobiology group at Queen Charlotte's and Chelsea Hospital in London], ' give the
foetus the benefit of the doubt', and extend the use of effective pain relief to surgical
procedures before birth.
Id. See also S. Vanhatalo & 0. Van Nieuwenhuizen, Fetal Pain, BRAIN AND DEVELOPMENT, May
24, 2000 (stating that the proper response to evidence of fetal response to noxious stimuli is to avoid
or treat any possibly noxious stimuli rather than speculate on the possible emotional experiences of
pain by the fetus or neonate). See also, Mark Owens, Pain in Infancy: Conceptual and
Methodological Issues, 20 PAIN 213, 230 (Nov. 1984).
If the assumption that infants experience pain is correct, then the benefits are measured
by a decrease in needless human suffering. The cost of a mistaken assumption of infant
pain would be to waste the effort. Costs and benefits come down squarely on the side of
assuming that infants do experience pain. The burden of proof should be shifted to those
who maintain that infants do not feel pain.
Id.
argument by referring to the development of the fetal nervous system. The
spinal cord and brain develop within the neural tube of the human, embryo.
This tube forms within the first two to three weeks of gestation.2' Within
four weeks after conception, the primitive structures of the brain are
recognizable.22 The internal structure of the brain will continue to develop
throughout the pregnancy and during the first year of infancy, eventually
resulting in a complex structure that regulates many distinct physical
processes.23
In addition to the brain and spinal cord, the human nervous system
involves an intricate network of peripheral receptors and transmitters. 4 The
receptors specifically involved in discerning pain are called nociceptors.25
Nociceptors are naked nerve endings that lie free in the skin and have their
cell bodies in the dorsal root ganglia.26 They respond to pressure, thermal
and chemical stimuli, and transmit their sensory signals to the spinal cord,
and ultimately to the brain, via cutaneous nerve fibres.27 The network of
nociceptors and fibres develop in the period from seven to twenty weeks
gestation, beginning with the skin of the face, continuing to the soles of the
hands and feet, and ultimately covering the entire body.28 The fibres are
connected to the central nervous system via a network of synapse-like
connections to the cells of the fetal dorsal horn in the spinal cord.29
Impulses received by the dorsal horn are transmitted to the various parts of
the brain via neural and chemical connections.3°
When received by the brain, the impulses enter the thalamus.3 The
thalamus registers the impulse and, if the impulse is identified as one of
organic pain, physiologically signals the motor nerves to initiate the body's
complex reflexive response to pain.32 After interconnection, the thalamus
21. Parliamentary Office of Science & Tech., supra note 15, at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. J.A. Rushford, Pain Perception, in FETAL & NEONATAL NEUROLOGY AND NEUROSURGERY
601 (Malcolm I. Levine & Richard J. Lilford, Sr. eds., 1995).
27. Id.
28. Phil Anand & D.B. Carr, The Neuroanatomy, Neuophysiology, and Neurochemistry of Pain,
Stress and Analgesia in Newborns and Children, 36 ACUTE PAIN IN CHILDREN 795, 798 (Aug.
1989).
29. Rushford, supra note 26, at 602.
30. K.J.S. Anand & P.J. McGrath, The Applied Physiology of Pain, in PAIN IN NEONATES 40
(1993).
31. Id.
32. RICHARD S. SNELL, CLINICAL NEUROANATOMY: A REVIEW WITH QUESTIONS AND
EXPLANATIONS 138 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that "[a] vast amount of sensory information (except
smell) converges on the thalamus and is integrated through the interconnections between the nuclei.
The resulting information pattern is distributed to other parts of the central nervous system.").
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may also forward the initial impulse to the cortex of the brain for more
complex processing including psychological reaction and directed physical
responses. 33  Both the thalamus and cortex are recognizable in the basic
brain structure from about six weeks gestation. They continue to grow in
size and internal structure throughout the pregnancy. 34  The thalamus,
however, develops and interconnects with the nervous system much earlier
than the cortex. By twelve weeks of gestation the thalamus is sufficiently
mature to respond to impulses received from the sensory network.35 Only at
twenty weeks or beyond is the interconnection between the thalamus and the
cortex sufficiently developed for the cortex to receive the impulses
transmitted from the network via the thalamus.36
From the perspective of neurological development, the key to answering
the question of whether fetuses experience pain depends primarily upon the
development and function of the various regions of the brain. While simple
reflex responses can be observed as early as seven weeks of gestation, there
is no involvement of the brain. In the absence of any brain activity there can
be no perception of pain, according to the current consensus of the medical
community.37  Where medical opinion divides is over whether pain
perception by the human fetus is controlled exclusively by the cortex or
whether the thalamus and lower brain stem can generate perceptions of pain.
Some physicians argue that the earlier development of the thalamus and
lower brain stem is sufficient for pain perception. Citing evidence obtained
through observation of anencephalic and hydranencephalic infants who have
no or minimal cortex development, these experts argue that pain perception
is not dependant upon established connections from the thalamus to the
cortex, but can exist after the thalamus establishes its connection with the
sensory network.3 8 This connection can be established as early as twelve
33. Id.
34. Parliamentary Office of Science & Tech., supra note 15, at 2.
35. Id.
36. MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE MRC EXPERT GROUP ON FETAL PAIN, §3.3
(2001), available at http://www.mrc.ac.uk/index/publications/publicatoins-researchreviews.htm.
"Connections from the thalamus to the cortex begin to form at about 20 weeks gestation.. .and
continue to mature along with other cortical connections well into childhood and adolescence." Id.
37. CARE COMMISSION ON INQUIRY INTO FETAL SENTIENCE, HUMAN SENTIENCE BEFORE BIRTH
§ 5.2.1 (1996), available at http://www.care.org.uk/resource/pub/fs/fs05.htm#5_2_1.
38. CARE COMMISSION ON INQUIRY INTO FETAL SENTIENCE, supra note 37, § 5.3.1. See also
Stephen G. Waxman, in CORRELATIVE NEUROANATOMY 125 (24th ed. 2000). "The thalamus
(rather than the sensory cortex) is thought to be the crucial structure for the perception of some types
of sensation, especially pain, and the sensory cortex may function to give finer detail to the
sensation." Id. This conclusion, although distinguishable, is consistent with the statement of the
American Academy of Pediatrics that "[t]he decision [to administer anesthesia to neonates
weeks of gestation. Thus some experts would date possible pain perception
at twelve to thirteen weeks.3 9
Other physicians assert that the cortex-thalamus connection is essential
to the experience of pain. Since the earliest this connection is established is
between twenty and twenty-four weeks of gestation, these experts assert that
only those fetuses of twenty or more weeks of gestation are capable of
experiencing pain.40  This position seems to dominate the thinking of
organized medicine as evidenced by the recent policy positions on
administering anesthetic or performing feticide prior to abortions performed
during or after twenty weeks of gestation.41
II. RECENT CHANGES IN MEDICAL STANDARDS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE
POSSIBILITY OF FETAL PAIN
While advocates involved in the abortion debate had long argued over
whether a human fetus feels pain,42 on July 9, 1994 Lancet, a highly
respected British medical journal, published an article that seemingly
changed the parameters of the debate. In Fetal Plasma Cortisol and fl-
endorphin Response to Intrauterine Needling,43 researchers reported the
results of a study investigating fetal hormonal response to intrauterine
needling. Summarizing the implications of their results, the authors stated
that, "data suggest[s] that the fetus mounts hormonal stress response to
invasive procedures .... [and] raise the possibility that the human fetus feels
undergoing surgical procedures] should not be based solely on the infant's age or perceived degree
of cortical maturity."
American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Neonatal Anesthesia, 80 PEDIATRICS 446
(1987), available at http://www.aap.org/policy/01730.html.
39. CARE COMMISSION ON INQUIRY INTO FETAL SENTIENCE, supra note 37, § 8.1. See also
Mary Sheridan & Roger Highfield, Growing Pains, LONDON TELEGRAPH (Oct. 12, 2001) (reporting
that 80% of British neuroscientists responding to survey believed that the fetus should receive pain
control after eleven weeks of gestation).
40. E.g. MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, § 3.3.
41. The British Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists recommend that, prior to the
termination of a pregnancy during or after 24 weeks of gestation, practitioners consider the need for
fetal analgesia and sedation. Andrea O'Donnell, AndBefore Birth?, 349 LANCET 546 (1997) (citing
BRITISH ROYAL COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, FETAL AWARENESS: REPORT
OF A WORKING PARTY (1997)). "In order to reduce suffering" the College of Physicians and
Surgeons of Alberta (Canada) recommend "feticide prior to initiating the termination procedure"
during or after twenty weeks of gestation through intracardiac injection of KCI into the fetus in
utero. Id.
42. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Experience of Pain by the Unborn, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
HUMAN ABORTION 205 (Thomas W. Hilgers et al. eds., 1981); see also Cristine Russell, Physician
Group Supports President on Fetus Pain; WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 14, 1984, at A6.
43. Xenophon Giannakoulopoulos et al., Fetal Plasma Cortisol and fl-endorphin Response to
Intrauterine Needling, 344 LANCET 77 (1994).
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pain in utero, and may benefit from anesthesia or analgesia for invasive
procedures." 44
This sparked a lively debate within the British medical community, and
resulted in numerous investigations into the question of whether human
fetuses feel pain. In May of 1995, the Department of Heath for the United
Kingdom commissioned "an update on current scientific knowledge" by
Professor Maria Fitzgerald. 45 Based on a review of all scientific literature
then available, she concluded that a human fetus could only perceive pain
after the neural connections are established to the cortex during or after the
twenty-sixth week of gestation.46
In January 1996, a private British organization, the Christian Action,
Research, and Education Trust ("CARE Trust") created the Commission of
Inquiry into Fetal Sentience.47 After almost a year of collecting and
evaluating evidence,48 the Commission found:
Almost everyone now agrees that unborn babies have the ability to
feel pain by 24 weeks after conception and there is a considerable
and growing body of evidence that the fetus may be able to
experience suffering from around 11 weeks of development. Some
commentators point out that the earliest movement in the baby has
been observed at 5.5 weeks after conception, and that it may be able
to suffer from this stage.49
Based upon this finding the Commission recommended that from the early
stages of gestation the fetus should be protected from potentially painful
procedures by the use of adequate anesthesia. 50 In July 1996, the All-Party
Parliamentary Pro-Life Group also produced a paper on fetal pain, which
concluded that "the anatomical structures in the fetal nervous system
necessary for the appreciation of pain are 'present and functional before the
tenth week of intrauterine life."' 5 '
44. Giannakoulopoulos et al., supra note 43, at 77.
45. Parliamentary Office of Science & Tech., supra note 15, at 2.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Commission is also referred to by some commentators as the "Rawlinson
Commission" in reference to the fact that it was chaired by the Right Honorable Lord Rawlinson of
Ewall, PC QC. See also Derbyshire, supra note 9.
48. Wyatt, supra note 20, at 2.
49. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO FETAL SENTIENCE, HUMAN SENTIENCE BEFORE BIRTH § 2,
available at http://www.care.org.uk/resource/pub/fs.fsO2.htm.
50. Id. § 8.
51. Parliamentary Office of Science & Tech., supra note 15, at 2. See also Muir, supra note 8, at
Responding to these and other reports that the human fetus exhibited
pain-like responses in utero, the Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists of Great Britain established a working party to determine
whether a fetus might be aware of pain, and if so, what the implications of
that determination might be on diagnostic and therapeutic procedures carried
out on the fetus, as well as termination of pregnancy when the fetus is not
expected to live.52 In October 1997, the Royal College issued its Working
Party Report on Fetal Awareness. Based upon the physiological and
behavioral evidence, the Working Party recommended that practitioners who
undertake procedures directly on the fetus, or who undertake termination of
a pregnancy at 24 weeks or later, should consider the requirements of fetal
analgesia or sedation prior to the procedure. 3
In 1999, the British Department of Health requested that the Medical
Research Council review the report of the Royal College and make
recommendations as to areas where further scientific research was needed.54
As a result of their study, members of the Council's expert panel found that
the sensory pathways and connections to the cortex necessary for pain
perception are present or begin to form at twenty weeks gestation.5 5 This
has prompted calls for the Royal College to change its recommendation
concerning the use of fetal analgesia in fetal surgery or abortions back from
twenty-four weeks to twenty weeks. 6
This would be consistent with the policy of the College of Physicians
and Surgeons of Alberta, Canada. In the summer of 2000, the Alberta
College modified its policy on termination of pregnancy to "reduce suffering
where intervention is necessary to terminate pregnancy after 20 weeks/0
days" by recommending that the fetus be killed via intracardiac injection of
potassium chloride prior to initiating the termination procedure.
5 7
8.
The society's [Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child] current line on foetal pain
is based on research by Dr. Peter McCullagh, of the Australian National University in
Canberra, and published in July by the All Party Parliamentary Pro-life Group.... Dr.
McCullagh argues that it is also possible to make a judgment [about the existence of fetal
pain] by establishing the presence of nerve and brain faculties that register pain in
developed humans. He concludes that these faculties are likely to be developed by the
tenth week of life.
Id.
52. ROYAL COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, DESCRIPTION OF WORKING
PARTY REPORT ON FETAL AWARENESS (1997).
53. Id. See also David James, Recent Advances: Fetal Medicine, 316 BRIT. MED. J. 1580 (1998).
54. MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF REPORT ON FETAL PAIN (2001), available at
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/index/publications-publications/publications-research-reviews/publications-
fetalpainsummary-report.htm.
55. ld. §3.3.
56. See Roger Highfield, Unborn Child Can Feel Pain at 20 Weeks, Say Researchers, THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 28, 2001, at 2.
57. COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF ALBERTA, TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY
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III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN LAWS THAT SEEK TO PROTECT THE
FETUS FROM PAIN
In the United States, questions regarding fetal pain are entangled in the
debate over abortion. Typically those who identify themselves as "prolife"
have maintained that the fetus feels pain, while those who embrace the label
"prochoice" have argued that fetal pain is a myth.58 As early as the 1970's
certain states have enacted laws seeking to minimize fetal suffering.59 The
constitutionality of these statutes has been reviewed by the courts in two
contexts, statutes requiring women be informed of the possibility of fetal
pain, and statutes restricting or prohibiting particular methods of abortion in
an attempt to minimize fetal pain. Under the current abortion jurisprudence
of the United States Supreme Court, it appears that statutes informing
women of the possibility of fetal pain would be constitutionally
permissible,6 ° while statutes restricting or prohibiting particular methods of
abortion in order to minimize or avoid fetal pain would not.
61
A. Statutes Restricting or Mandating Particular Methods ofAbortion
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court examined a Nebraska law
prohibiting the use of "an abortion procedure in which the person
performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child
before killing the unbom child and completing the delivery. 62 In holding
the statute unconstitutional, the majority found that the law effectively
outlawed both dismemberment and partial birth abortions.63 Read broadly,
the prohibition unduly burdened women's ability to obtain abortions in the
second half of pregnancy, and therefore violated the Constitution.64 Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, explained that the statute also failed
(2000).
58. What About Abortion Victims?, THE NEW AMERICAN, Oct. 8, 2001, available at
http://thenewamerican. comltna/2OO /lO-O8-2001/insider/vo I 7no2 ]_abortion. htm. See also Gregg
Easterbrook, What Neither Side Wants You to Know. Abortion and Brain Waves, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2000, at 2 1.
59. See 720 Il1. St. Ch. 720 §51016, formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991 ch. 38 81-26.
60. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (holding that a Pennsylvania
statute requiring physician to provide truthful information to women is not an undue burden on the
tight to obtain an abortion). Id.
61. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (holding that a Nebraska law prohibiting
the D&X procedure is unconstitutional).
62. Id. at 922.
63. Id. at 938-39.
64. Id. at 945-46.
constitutional review because it contained no exception for performing the
procedure when necessary to sustain the health of the mother. 65 In their
concurrence, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg argued that the statute was
irrational, and that the state could not justify a ban on any particular abortion
procedure as advancing its interest in potential human life, since no lives
were saved.66
Similarly, mandating fetal anesthetic or feticide prior to mid or late-term
abortions may be attacked as irrational. A statute mandating modification of
abortion procedures or administration of fetal anesthetic to preclude the
possibility of fetal pain saves no lives. The state's interest in the protection
of women's physical health is not advanced,67 and courts may view any
claim that the information advances the emotional or psychological well
being of women with some skepticism.
68
Even assuming the courts recognize the state's interest in limiting fetal
suffering as substantial,69 in order to survive constitutional review any law
mandating fetal anesthetic or modified procedures would have to contain an
exception for the health of the mother, and the effect of such an exception is
a subject of substantial debate. 70  The constitutionality of mandating fetal
anesthetic would be enhanced by limiting the law to abortions occurring
after viability, yet viability and inception of the capacity to feel pain are not
simultaneous, 7' leaving some cases where fetal suffering would occur.
These objections suggest that the better legislative approach is a statute
informing women of the possibility of fetal pain and offering them the
opportunity to direct the use of fetal anesthetic.
B. Informed Consent Type Statutes
Research revealed only one case involving constitutional review of a
statute requiring that women be informed of fetal pain. In Charles v.
Carey,72 a federal court of appeals reversed a trial court's refusal to grant a
65. Id.at930-31.
66. Id. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67. See Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998).
68. Compare the summary of research and bibliographies related to post-abortion regret prepared
by the Elliot Institute, available at http://www.afterabortion.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2002), with the
information provided by the National Abortion Federation at http://www.prochoice.org/ (last visited
Nov. 1,2002).
69. See Women's Medical Prof'l Corp. v. Ohio, 162 F.Supp.2d 929, 936 n.7 (S.D. Ohio 2001)
(assuming validity of state's interest in minimizing fetal pain).
70. See Kevin Walsh, Note, The Science, Law and Politics of Fetal Pain Legislation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2010, 2023-31 (2002).
71. Id. Viability is now considered to be achieved generally in the twenty-forth week of
gestation, while research dates the ability to experience fetal pain as arising earlier in the pregnancy.
Id. at 2012-15.
72. Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
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preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Illinois statutes governing
abortion.73 One of the provisions at issue required physicians to inform
patients of any reasonable medical certainty of organic pain74 to the fetus
that might result from the particular abortion method to be employed, and of
available ways to control such pain.75  The statute provided criminal
penalties for physicians who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
disregard its requirements.76 Relying upon the Supreme Court's opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,77 the Court of Appeals found that the
Illinois informed consent statutes unconstitutionally intruded into the
physician/patient relationship.78 In addressing the provisions requiring that a
woman be informed of the possibility of fetal pain, the court stated:
The uncontroverted medical testimony in the record at this stage
describes this information as "medically meaningless, confusing,
medically unjustified, and contraindicated, causing cruel and
harmful stress to... patients." The defendants have submitted no
evidence to rebut the plaintiffs' characterization of this information
as false and unwarranted. Even assuming, therefore, that the State
may further at all stages of pregnancy its asserted interest in
"humane disposition of the fetus," a question we do not decide, the
record now before us indicates that this particular informational
requirement furthers no such purpose.79
At the conclusion of subsequent proceedings, the federal district court,
following the lead of the appellate court, struck down the portion of the
Illinois statute that required physicians inform women of the possibility that
a fetus would experience pain when certain abortion techniques were
utilized.80 Relying upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, Inc.,81 the district court held that the
73. Id. at 792.
74. "Organic pain is a physiological or neurological response to noxious (harmful or damaging)
stimuli." WILLIAM F. COLLITON, JR. & JOHN CAVANAUGH-O'KEEFE, FETAL PAIN: AN AGONIZING
REALITY I (American Life League, Inc. ed. 1996).
75. Charles, 627 F.2d at 782.
76. Id.
77. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
78. Charles, 627 F.2d at 784.
79. Id.
80. Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 464, 470 (N.D. I11. 1983).
81. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). This case
is often referred to as Akron L
Illinois requirement was a direct burden on the abortion decision and
therefore unconstitutional.82 The continuing viability of this decision,
however, is suspect in light of advances in medical knowledge regarding
fetal pain and the Supreme Court's repudiation of much of the reasoning and
the holding of Akron I in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
83
In Casey, the Court addressed the constitutionality of informed consent
legislation at length. However, no single standard of review for abortion
legislation commanded the support of a majority of the justices. According
to Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas, the proper test is whether
the state law at issue is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in
regulating the exercise of the liberty interest of the woman in obtaining an
abortion.84 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter opined that the proper
test is whether the law imposes an undue burden on the woman's liberty
interest in obtaining an abortion.85 A law imposes an undue burden when it
"has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. 86 Justice Stevens asserted
that the proper standard was whether the law sought to influence a woman's
choice (therefore unconstitutional), or merely enhances the deliberative
quality of the woman's choice (constitutional).87 Neutral regulations on the
health aspects of her decision would also be constitutional in Justice
Stevens' opinion.88 Justice Blackmun would have evaluated "informed
consent" laws under strict scrutiny, requiring the state to show that the
limitation "is both necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest." 89 Because seven justices concurred in upholding
the informed consent aspects of the Pennsylvania statutes, and because the
"undue burden" standard was the most protective of the woman's asserted
liberty interest, lower courts have utilized the "undue burden" analysis as the
proper standard for reviewing abortion legislation.90 This interpretation is
consistent with the Supreme Court's instruction in prior cases regarding the
treatment of plurality opinions. 9'
82. Charles, 579 F. Supp. at 470-71.
83. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
84. Id. at 966. (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part).
85. Id. at 876.
86. Id. at 877.
87. Id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 917.
89. Id. at 934. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in
part).
90. See Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 166-67 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that
regulations addressing medical and safety aspects of abortion do not constitute undue burdens); see
also Women's Med. Ctr. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that undue burden test is
proper standard for review of abortion clinic regulations).
91. "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
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Two types of information requirements were at issue in Casey: 1)
requirements that a physician give particular information to the woman (i.e.
risks of abortion and childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the
child), and 2) requirements that the woman be informed of the availability of
information regarding fetal development and resources for adoption and
abortion alternatives. 92 These requirements were addressed separately by the
plurality opinion.
The Pennsylvania requirement that a woman be informed of the
probable gestational age of the child was upheld in Casey because of the
state's "important" interest in potential life, and because of the state's
interest in protecting the psychological well being of women seeking
abortions. 93 "Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to
the decision." 94 However, the gestational age requirement could also be
defended as protecting the woman's physical health, since the gestational
age of the child is a relevant consideration in the selection of an abortion
technique and impacts the probability of post-operative complications.95
The Casey court also upheld Pennsylvania's requirement that a woman
be informed of the availability of state prepared materials describing fetal
development and alternatives to abortion.
We also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to
inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials
relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those
consequences have no direct relation to her health. An example
illustrates the point. We would think it constitutional for the State
to require that in order for there to be informed consent to a kidney
transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with information
about risks to the donor as well as risks to himself or herself.
96
the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds ... ' Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
93. Id. at 880.
94. Id. at 882.
95. "Although medical acceptability, and logistical factors are important, the most fundamental
determinant of the set of abortion options open to a woman and her provider is the duration of the
pregnancy to be terminated." David A. Grimes, Sequelae of Abortion, in MODERN METHODS OF
INDUCING ABORTION 95, 105 (David T. Baird et al. eds., 1995).
96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83.
This expansion of permissible considerations to matters beyond those
which can be shown to directly impact the woman's health, strongly
suggests that it may be constitutional to enact legislation requiring a woman
be provided truthful information regarding the possibility that a fetus may
experience pain during the abortion.
However, even if it is permissible for the state to require that women be
informed of fetal pain, the wording of any such legislation must be carefully
drafted to avoid challenges due to vagueness. California legislation on fetal
pain proposed in 1998 may have suffered from such infirmity. Section (c) of
California Bill AB 1758, as amended in Assembly, required the physician
"offer information and counseling on fetal pain., 97  This requirement,
however, seemed to be modified by the language of section (f), "the
pregnant woman shall sign a document that information and counseling on
fetal pain was provided and that the physician offered anesthesia for the
fetus."9 It could be argued that subsection (c) merely requires information
be offered, while subsection (f) requires the woman actually receive
information and counseling. This ambiguity concerning what is required of
physicians could have provided the basis for a constitutional challenge had
the legislation been enacted. 99 As originally proposed, a fetal pain bill
presented to the Texas House of Representatives suffered from the same
defect. 100
A more carefully crafted bill has been introduced this legislative session
in New York. Assembly Bill 7940, and its companion Senate Bill 3385,
requires a physician to "(a) orally and in person provide her [the pregnant
woman] with information on fetal pain; and (b) personally give her the
written material with information on fetal pain that has been prepared by the
commissioner [of the New York State Health Department]" prior to
performing an abortion in cases involving a fetus of twenty weeks or more in
gestational age.1 °1
According to the reasoning of Casey, the New York provision, if
enacted, would have been constitutional. The plurality opinion in Casey
found that it is constitutionally permissible to require physicians to offer
materials prepared by others or provide actual information and counseling
97. AB § 1758 § I(d)(2), 1997-98 Reg. See. (Cal. 1998), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_1751-1800/ab_1758_bill_19980423_amended_
asm.html.
98. Id.
99. The legislation died in committee by a vote of 8 in favor to 11 opposed, to passage of the bill.
See Complete Bill History, at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_1751-
1800/ab_1758 vote 19980505_000001 _asm comm.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
100. HB 1244 §170.054(b)(1)(B), 77thl Leg. (Tex. 2001), available at http://www.capitol.state.
tx.us/tlo/billnbr.htm. As was the case with the California proposal, the Texas bill died in committee.
101. AB § 7940 § 2516 (I)(B), 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (NY 2001), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg. See Walsh, supra, note 72.
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on fetal development." 2 The capacity of the fetus to feel pain is an aspect of
fetal development of special concern to women considering abortion.
10 3
Therefore a law requiring physicians provide medically accurate information
about fetal pain to women should be constitutional. This optimism is
supported by post-Casey treatment of informed consent legislation by the
lower federal courts.
In Karlin v. Foust,10 4 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reviewed a constitutional challenge to a statute similar to a fetal pain statute.
The Wisconsin statute at issue required, among other things, that a woman
be informed of "the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of
the woman's unborn child at the time the information is given.""1 5 Plaintiffs
challenged this provision as unconstitutionally vague because "physicians
have no way of knowing .whether their descriptions of the 'probable'
characteristics of the fetus are adequate or accurate enough to avoid
liability."'0 6  The court rejected this argument and interpreted Casey as
permitting state requirements that doctors "inform a woman seeking an
abortion of information relating to the fetus, and the consequences of the
abortion on the fetus, even when that information has no direct relation to
the mother's health.' 1 7  Only when it can be shown that the required
information is false and misleading is such a requirement unconstitutional.'0 8
The Karlin court buttressed its conclusion by affirming the trial court's
interpretation of the statute that a physician is to inform the patient to the
extent that providing such information is consistent with the individual
physician's best medical judgment as to the patient's well being.10 9 For
example, if "a physician believes that no psychological trauma is associated
with the abortion procedure to be used, that is what the statute requires him
or her to tell the patient.," 0  Recognizing the risk that this individual
discretion might be read as an invitation to circumvent the requirements of
the statute, the Court cautioned that protection from liability was dependent
102. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882-83 (1992).
103. "Patients may be frightened by antiabortion protesters or materials falsely alleging... that
abortion causes fetal pain. Giving them facts and valid sources of information usually eliminates
these fears." Anne Baker et al., Informed Consent, Counseling, and Patient Preparation, in A
CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION 27, 27 (Maureen Paul et al. eds., 1999).
104. Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1999).
105. Id. at 454 (discussing Wis. STAT. § 253.10(3)(c)1 (2002)).
106. Id. at 471.
107. Id. at 472, n.12.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 472-73.
110. Id. at472.
upon the exercise of the physician's best medical judgment based on the
physician's training and experience."'
Perhaps even more encouraging than Karlin's affirmation of
informed consent statutes is the dicta contained in Women's
Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich. 12 In reviewing a statute
restricting D&X, also known as "partial birth" abortion, the court
suggested that a fetal pain statute would be a reasonable manner of
accommodating the state's interest in preventing cruelty to fetuses.
"Assuming, however, that the fetus is conscious of the pain
involved in the D & X procedure, it appears to this Court that the
state could still seek to vindicate its asserted interest in preventing
arguably unnecessary cruelty to the fetus, by regulating the
procedure without banning it outright."' 13
Although the testimony on this issue was not conclusive, one such
possible regulation may require the physician to cut the umbilical
cord prior to making an incision in the base of the skull, and to wait
until the fetus dies as a result. Another possible regulation might
require the use of local or general anesthetic, on the fetus or the
mother. By use of such regulations, states could prevent arguably
unnecessary cruelty in the abortion procedure, without taking away
the right to seek a pre-viability abortion.' 14
If Karlin and Voinovich represent the approach federal courts would
take in reviewing fetal pain statutes, it would be constitutional to require
abortion providers to inform women of the possibility that the fetus would
experience fetal pain during the abortion process, and offer to administer
111. Id. at 473.
112. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd on
other grounds, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997). The court addressed the state's argument that the Ohio
ban of D&X abortion was in furtherance of the state's interest in avoiding unnecessary cruelty to the
fetus during the abortion process. Id. The court agreed that the state has an interest in preventing
unnecessary cruelty to fetuses. Id. at 1072. However, the evidence on the existence of fetal pain
was contradictory and the ban at issue was not sufficiently narrow in pursuit of the state's interest.
Id. at 1078.
113. Id. at 1075.
114. Id. See also Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1998). "No
argument is made, and we are not aware of any basis for such an argument, that if a fetus feels pain,
the pain is worse when the fetus is killed in the birth canal than when death occurs a moment earlier
in the womb." Id. The court in Doyle concluded by stating, "therefore Wisconsin's statute cannot
be analogized to statutes that prohibit cruelty to animals." Id. See also Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F.
Supp. 2d 1024, 1042 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (stating that "it is hard to imagine that even the gruesome
partial birth abortion procedure would be more painful to a fetus than being tom limb from limb as
in an ordinary D & E procedure.").
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fetal anesthesia to minimize the pain. Even if other courts interpret Casey
more restrictively, under the narrowest construction of Casey, it is
constitutional to require that providers inform women of the availability of
state-prepared materials regarding fetal pain and to provide those materials
upon request.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE FETUS FROM PAIN AND
POSSIBLE RESPONSES
The constitutionality of any proposed statute requiring that women
seeking abortions be informed of fetal pain and offered fetal anesthesia,
however, is largely irrelevant if the appropriate legislative or policy making
body is unpersuaded as to the need or prudence of such a requirement.
Establishing that the fetus is physiologically capable of experiencing pain is
just the first step in making the case for the legislation. Beyond disputing
the existence of the fetal capacity to experience pain, opponents of proposed
legislation in the various states have raised several objections that must be
addressed in order to obtain public support for fetal pain legislation.
By far, the most serious objection, if true, is that administering
anesthesia to the fetus would pose a health risk to the mother.1 5 Opponents
of fetal pain legislation have argued that the health of women would be
adversely affected by the use of fetal anesthesia. This simply is not relevant
where the statutory requirement is merely informational. A physician has a
fiduciary duty to inform the woman of any known adverse affects from any
aspect of a proposed treatment.1 6 In the rare case of a woman, whose
physical health or life would be adversely affected to a medically significant
degree by the use of fetal anesthetic, the physician would have a duty to so
advise her. 117
In the vast majority of cases, however, use of fetal anesthetic poses no
medically significant risk to the mother. 18 This was established in hearings
before the United States Senate Committee evaluating legislation banning
115. Memorandum from the California Chapter of the American Association of University
Women, to Martin Gallegos, Chair of the Assembly Health Committee (April 27, 1998) (on file with
author); Letter from the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, District IX, to Martin
Gallegos, Chair of the Assembly Health Committee (April 23, 1998) (on file with author).
116. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 9,
32 (5th ed. 1984).
117. Id. § 32, at 189-90.
118. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 107-08 (1995) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Dr. Norig
Ellison).
partial birth abortion. Responding to pregnant patients' alarm caused by
abortion rights activists' claims that maternal anesthetic caused the death of
the fetus prior to performance of the D&X procedure, the American Society
of Anesthesiologists testified that the separate physical integrity of the
mother and fetus minimized any collateral affect of maternal anesthesia on
the fetus." 9
Should exceptional circumstances exist where use of fetal anesthetic
poses a threat to the mother's life or physical health, the physician would
have an obligation to inform the woman of these risks and, doubtless, she
would decline consent to use of the anesthetic.
20
A much weaker, but related, objection was raised by California
physicians' groups, who protested that any legally required discussion of
fetal pain was an unwarranted intrusion into the physician-patient
relationship.12 1 This objection relies upon pre-Casey rhetoric suggesting that
a state may not mandate any particular information be given to a woman
considering abortion. 2  Yet any support earlier cases may lend to this
complaint is directly repudiated in Casey. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter recognized,
To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation
when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of
truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the
procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the
'probable gestational age' of the fetus, those cases go too far, are
inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgement of an important interest
in potential life, and are overruled.' 23
119. Id.
120. The California bill required the physician to inform the woman of "the effects [of fetal
anesthesia] on both the fetus and the pregnant woman when anesthesia is administered to the fetus."
AB § 1758 §l(d)(2), 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998). The Texas bill excused use of fetal anesthesia
in cases where the physician reasonably believed its use would "increase the risk to the woman's life
or physical health" or if the woman refused to consent to its use. HB 1244 §170.054(b)(1)(B), 77th
Leg. (Tex. 2001). Similarly the New York legislation excludes use of fetal anesthetic in cases where
the physician reasonably believes "the administration of an anesthetic or analgesic would cause the
pregnant woman's death or would create a serious risk of a substantial and irreversible impairment
of a major bodily function." AB § 7940 § 2516 (1)(B), 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (NY 2001).
121. See Letter from the California Medical Association, to Martin Gallegos, Chair of the
Assembly Health Committee (April 30, 1998) (on file with author); Letter from The American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, District IX, to Martin Gallegos, Chair of the Assembly
Health Committee (April 23, 1998) (on file with author); Letter from The California District
American Academy of Pediatrics, to Assembly Member George Runner (no date on file) (on file
with author).
122. Compare Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1021 (1st Cir. 1981).
123. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general matter, in
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The plurality opinion goes on to specifically approve the providing of
information "relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those
consequences have no direct relation to her [the woman's] health."'124
Various groups have also objected to offering women information about
fetal pain and anesthesia on the basis that abortions after twelve weeks are
rare. 125 It is true that a substantial majority of abortions in the United States
occur within the first twelve weeks of gestation. 26  Nonetheless, this
objection seems unrelated to the issue of whether women obtaining
abortions after a pregnancy has progressed beyond twelve weeks, should be
informed of their opportunity to request fetal anesthesia or analgesic,
foreclosing the possibility that the fetus would experience pain during the
termination of the pregnancy.
Opponents of fetal pain legislation have also objected to informing
women of the ability of the fetus to experience pain, arguing that such
information unreasonably increases the emotional burden for families
"already facing a devastating personal situation."' 127  Implicit in this
objection are two assumptions: first, that the overwhelming majority of
women seeking abortions after twelve weeks are doing so because of the
discovery of fetal abnormalities or the development of a pregnancy-related
condition threatening the mother's health or life, and second, that being
informed of the ability to foreclose fetal pain through the use of fetal
anesthetic will be an additional burden to an already emotionally fragile
woman. The first assumption is highly contested, and the second is
irrational.
the present context it is derivative of the woman's position.... Thus, a requirement that a
doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion
is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give specific
information about any medical procedure.
Id. at 884.
124. Id. at 882.
125. For examples of opponents arguing that third trimester abortions are rare, see Jenifer Warren,
California and the West: For Aborted Fetuses, A Question of Pain, L.A. TIMES, Jan 4, 1998, at 3A;
Memorandum from the California Chapter of the American Association of University Women, to
Martin Gallegos, Chair of the Assembly Health Committee (April 27, 1998) (on file with author);
Letter from the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, District IX, to Martin
Gallegos, Chair of the Assembly Health Committee (April 23, 1998) (on file with author).
126. According to the most recent figures from the Centers for Disease Control issued in the
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 88% of all abortions obtained in 1999 occurred before the
thirteenth week of pregnancy. Julie L. Gerberding et al., Abortion Surveillance: United States, 1999,
51 MMWR 1 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/ss5l09.pdf.
127. Letter from the California Medical Association, to Martin Gallegos, Chair of the Assembly
Health Committee (April 30, 1998) (on file with author). See also Warren, supra note 125, at 3A.
During the 1997 congressional debates surrounding a national ban on
the procedure known as a "D&X abortion" or "partial birth abortion," Ron
Fitzsimmons, a spokesman for the National Abortion Federation, created a
political firestorm when he revealed to the New York Times that the
majority of D&X abortions involve "a healthy mother with a healthy fetus
that is twenty weeks or more along."'' 28 Subsequently he estimated that four
to five thousand D&X abortions occur annually. 129  Planned Parenthood
Federation of America lists a variety of reasons women obtain abortions
after the twelfth week of pregnancy, including having to travel long
distances to obtain an abortion, having to accumulate financial resources
from which to pay for the abortion, and having to comply with state laws
regarding parental involvement in minors' decisions to obtain abortions.
130
None of these reasons suggest that a woman would be particularly fragile
emotionally.
As for the claim that women will be "devastated" if told of the
possibility that the fetus feels pain, this reflects a false and out-dated
paternalism toward women seeking abortions. When contemplating their
response to problem pregnancies, women often ask about the ability of the
fetus to feel pain. 3' By withholding information, abortion providers risk
women subsequently learning of the emerging consensus surrounding fetal
pain and experiencing great regret.' 32  Perhaps even more importantly,
women are deprived of the opportunity to ensure the fetus feels no pain
during the abortion through the use of modified procedures or fetal
anesthetic.
A related objection is that for those abortions involving fetal
abnormalities, there is little reason to fear that the fetus suffers pain because
128. David Stout, An Abortion Rights Advocate Says He Lied About Procedure, N.Y. TIMES, FEB.
26, 1997, at A 12.
129. Douglas Johnson, Comforting Myths About Abortion, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2001. Compare
Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Incidence and Services in the United States in 2000, 35
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 6 (Jan./Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/joumals/35006303.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
130. PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, FACT SHEET: ABORTION AFTER THE
FIRST TRIMESTER (1997), available at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/facts/abotaftlst
010600.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
13 1. Baker et al., supra note 103, at 27.
132. Post-abortion regret is a common experience.
In the USA, it is estimated that 20% of women suffer from severe feelings of loss, grief
and regret. These feelings may progress to anger (at herself and at her partner), or to
depression and even obsession. These feelings are more likely to arise in women who:
lack social support; whose decision to terminate the pregnancy is in conflict with their
family or their religious beliefs; who feel they were pressurized into having an abortion;
who have abortion because of fetal anomaly; and who are very young or have a very late
abortion.
Anna Glasier, Counseling for Abortion, in MODERN METHODS OF INDUCING ABORTION 112, 117
(David T. Baird et al. eds., 1995).
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the brain and/or nervous system of those fetuses may have already been
severely compromised. 133  In the rare case where this is so, a physician
should inform the woman of these facts. There is no doubt this additional
information will influence her decision regarding the use of fetal anesthetic.
But the existence of these rare cases should not excuse the physician from a
duty to inform women of the possibility of fetal pain.
Additional objections have been raised based on misinformation
regarding the procedures involved in late term abortions. The American
Association of University Women advised California legislators that it is
customary practice in third trimester abortions to induce death prior to
removal of the fetus, making anesthesia unnecessary. 134 Representatives of a
California district of the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists argued that informing women of the possibility of fetal pain
is unnecessary because third trimester abortions most often occur in
hospitals and the doctors performing them must obtain approval from
hospital ethics committees.135 In fact, neither of these statements addresses
abortions occurring during the mid-trimester of pregnancy, and neither is
true in the majority of cases involving abortions after twelve weeks of
pregnancy. According to the most recently published medical text on
abortion, only seven percent of all abortions were performed in a hospital in
1992.136 During that year, only seventeen percent of abortions performed
after twenty weeks of gestation occurred in a hospital.1 37 Similarly, while a
few abortion providers insure the death of the fetus through lethal injection
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prior to beginning removal in a mid or third-trimester abortion,"' a numberof providers consider it unnecessary, and even dangerous in some cases. 39
V. CONCLUSION
In the end, legislators must confront whether women are entitled to
know of the growing body of medical literature establishing that the human
fetus is capable of experiencing pain after the first trimester of pregnancy. It
is not a sufficient answer to "assume" that women know, nor should
legislators assume that abortion providers will voluntarily inform women of
this research. Women have a right to know the probable consequences of
their choices. Many want to know the effect of the abortion on the fetus. 140
It is the worst sort of paternalism that suggests that because women may be
discomforted by this information, and may even make different choices
about continuing their pregnancy, that they should not be informed that they
can prevent unnecessary pain to the fetus. Legislation requiring that women
be informed of their ability to foreclose the possibility of fetal pain
facilitates informed choices by women, and may reduce to some small
degree the suffering associated with abortion.
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